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China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles 
 
Although there is no authoritative statement of policy from the Chinese government on the Arctic, 
scientists and academics in China are increasingly showing interest in the region, and suggesting policies 
and actions for the nation. Given that the United States is an Arctic littoral state* with interests in the 
region, this memo seeks to provide an overview of Chinese environmental, energy, economic, and 
security interests in the increasingly open and navigable Arctic. 
 
It is the consensus of many within the scientific community that large areas of the Arctic region will be 
ice-free during summer months in the coming decades.†1  This potential environmental transformation 
will likely have profound impacts on regional and global trade and security, especially related to shipping 
patterns and resource extraction activities.  While China is not an Arctic littoral state,  the melting of 
Arctic sea ice will impact China’s environmental, energy, and trade circumstances.  As a result, official 
and unofficial Chinese actors have expressed greater interest in the forthcoming “opening” of the Arctic 
in recent years.  However, without a claim to territory in the region, China is largely excluded from 
regional politics and regulatory management of Arctic resources. For this reason, China has thus far 
pursued a low-profile approach in its policies toward the region, and will likely have to rely on the 
invitation and cooperation of the Arctic states – especially Russia and Canada – in order to advance its 
interests there.  
 
 
China’s official Arctic policy – a work in progress 
 
High-level officials in China have yet to make any significant policy announcements regarding the Arctic 
region. China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue stated in 2009 that “China does not 
have an Arctic strategy,”2 and no significant policies have been announced since then. However, a few 
mid-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Oceanic Administration have 
commented publicly on China’s interests and activities related to the Arctic. Most of these official 
remarks or writings emphasize China’s interests in environmental and climate change developments in 
the region. Official commentary has also stressed that Arctic states must ensure that the Arctic remains 
a global commons, with non-Arctic states having access to the region and its resources.3 
 
To date, official Chinese comments on the Arctic have been limited to noting the importance of the 
Arctic to China and the value of open access to the region for all. At a 2009 Arctic forum in Norway, 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu emphasized that the Arctic impacts China’s environment, 
economy, society, and consequently, the trajectory of its sustainable development, noting, “*t+he 
government of China is, therefore, greatly concerned” about Arctic issues.4 
 
Hu also expressed that China respected the territorial rights of Arctic countries, but also warned that 
“Arctic countries should protect the balance between the interests of states with shorelines in the Arctic 
Ocean and the shared interests of the international community” in settling territorial claims. Some 
western analysts suggest that this comment reflects Chinese anxieties about being denied access to 
Arctic waterways by Arctic countries. This is reflected also in a 2010 article published by China’s State 
                                                     
*
 The five Arctic littoral states are Canada, Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory), Norway, Russia and the 
United States (by virtue of Alaska).  An additional three countries have territory in the Arctic Circle: Finland, Iceland 
and Sweden. 
†
 Some scientists have predicted that this will happen as soon as 2013.  
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Oceanic Administration, which concludes that the Arctic is the “inherited wealth of all humankind…The 
Arctic Ocean is not the backyard of any country and is not the ‘private property’ of the Arctic Ocean 
littoral states. As with Europe’s other oceans, under the framework of international law, every country 
in the world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean.”5 
 
Observed patterns of policy formation in China suggest that Beijing has not fully developed an 
overarching strategy for the region. Typically, the first stages of policy development in China involve a 
period of public debate over a particular issue. Following this, Beijing will bring the debate behind closed 
doors, thereby ending public discussion. After a period of internal policy wrangling, an official policy line 
will be announced.6 Given that (1) there have been no high-level policy pronouncements from Beijing 
regarding the Arctic, and (2) there currently is an ongoing, public debate over what China’s Arctic 
policies should look like, it is likely that China’s leaders still are in the early stages of developing an 
official policy toward the region. The current proliferation of voices and opinions on Chinese interests 
and goals in the Arctic suggest that academics, political commentators, the military, and other interest 
groups are all looking to inform and influence policymakers.7 
 
While China currently has no official Arctic strategy, current Chinese activity in the region and the 
discussion of Arctic issues within China provide some insight into a possible future Chinese approach to 
Arctic. A summary of these discussions and activities are provided below.  
 
 
China’s environmental research in the Arctic 
 
China’s Arctic interests and activities are heavily focused on environmental issues: the impacts of 
melting polar ice on China’s continental and oceanic environment, and implications for the country’s 
agricultural and economic development.8  Accordingly, Chinese policymakers have emphasized the 
importance of conducting scientific work in the region, and the country has made considerable 
investments in polar research since the 1990s.  It has undertaken four research expeditions, has an 
Arctic research station in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, and has a number of elite academic institutes 
dedicated to Arctic research.9  It also owns the world’s largest icebreaker vessel, Xuelong (Snow Dragon), 
which has been central to China’s polar research activities.10  China’s most recent Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015) calls for strengthened polar and oceanic scientific research and active “integrated marine 
management,” indicating that China’s interest and investment in polar environmental research will 
continue to grow.11  
 
China's participation in regional cooperative activities in the Arctic also is focused primarily on 
environmental research. China has had a role in several regional research projects and has been invited 
to participate in a number of international polar research organizations, including the International Polar 
Year Program, the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee, and the International Arctic Science 
Committee.12 China has a history of robust cooperation with Norway on Arctic environmental and 
scientific research. The Svaldbard research station, for example, has been operating since 2004, and 
since 2009, the two countries have conducted a formal Bilateral Dialogue on Arctic Issues, which has 
identified climate and environmental issues as areas of mutual interest.13 
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China’s energy prospects in the Arctic 
 
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic contains up to 30 percent of the 
world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources.‡14  These untapped 
resources will become more readily accessible as Arctic sea ice melts.§  According to the USGS, most of 
the potential oil and gas resources in the region are located within the territorial jurisdiction of Arctic 
states, and will thus be subject to the management and legal oversight of those countries.15  China’s 
territorial disadvantage, combined with its lack of cold-water drilling expertise, will preclude any 
substantive energy acquisitions by China in the Arctic, according to several analysts.16 
 
Still, there will be attractive opportunities for Chinese energy investments in the region.  A promising 
destination for these investments is Russia.  China and Russia already have extensive energy ties and 
could cooperate on Arctic energy as well.**  Speaking at the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the governor of the 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region in Russia - a coastal region which accounts for over 90 percent of 
Russian natural gas production - welcomed resource cooperation with China, saying “*w+e are ready to 
act as intermediaries between an investor country and the oil and gas sector and create a good 
investment climate.”17  
 
Another potential partner for China’s Arctic energy ambitions is Canada. In recent years, Chinese energy 
investments in Canada have grown significantly, with Chinese state-owned companies purchasing 
minority and controlling stakes in Canadian oil and gas projects worth $16 billion in 2010 and 2011. 18 
Meanwhile, Canadian policymakers seem to be looking to Asia to diversify the country’s energy trade 
away from the United States (which is the destination for the vast majority of Canadian energy 
exports).19  
 
Norway is another likely partner on energy. During meetings of the Bilateral Dialogue on Arctic Issues 
between China and Norway, discussions have been held on energy and resource issues. Norway’s cold-
water drilling expertise will likely be targeted by Chinese energy firms looking to gain know-how and 
investment.20 However, some reports suggest that current diplomatic tensions between Norway and 
China might hinder these collaborative efforts. Since the Oslo-based Nobel Committee awarded Chinese 
dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, China has stalled or halted economic and diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. It has been reported that in response to China’s behavior, Norway 
might block Beijing’s attempts to gain permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, a high-level 
intergovernmental regional forum that addresses environmental, resource, and climate issues in the 
Arctic.†† These reports contradict a recent foreign policy address by Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
expressing support for China’s application for permanent observer status.21 While gaining permanent 
                                                     
‡
 Besides gas and oil, the region contains large amounts of chromium, coal, copper, diamonds, gold, lead, 
manganese, nickel, rare earths, silver, titanium, tungsten, and zinc. Greenland is endowed with many of these 
resources and is an attractive destination for Chinese investment as a result. 
§
 On the other hand, warming temperatures will pose a number of obstacles to the successful exploration and 
acquisition of subsurface resources.  Permafrost instability can threaten project infrastructure, and unpredictable 
weather conditions and floating ice can endanger survey and extraction activities.    
**
 U.S.-Russian cooperation on Arctic energy is also likely to increase. In 2011, Exxon Mobil Corporation won a major 
Arctic oil exploration contract with Russia’s state-owned energy giant Rosneft. It competed with several international 
oil companies - including China’s CNPC - for the deal. 
††
 The Arctic Council has eight voting members: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. There are six permanent observer states (all European) and several ad-hoc 
observer states, including China, Japan, and South Korea. China has been vying for permanent observer status since 
2008. 
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observer status will not allow China any decision-making powers in the region, it would grant China 
unrestricted access to Arctic Council meetings.22  
 
 
China’s Shipping Prospects in the Arctic 
 
In 2009, China was the largest exporter and second-largest importer of globally shipped goods.23 As 
Arctic sea ice melts, two international shipping routes - the Northwest Passage and the Northeast 
Passage (also known as the Northern Sea Route) - will become increasingly usable for commercial 
shipping purposes (see map below).  China’s access to these alternate shipping routes could have 
profound impacts on China’s trade and shipping patterns in the future. For example, the Northeast 
Passage, which runs along Russia’s northern border from the Bering Strait to Nova Zemlya, is 6,400 
kilometers shorter than China’s route to Europe via the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal.24 China will 
conduct its first expedition through the Northeast Passage in the summer of 2012.25    
 
China stands to benefit from the Northeast Passage most obviously from the lower logistical and 
regulatory costs associated with shorter trips through less-traveled waters.  According to Dr. Guo 
Peiqing, Associate Professor at the Ocean University of China in Qingdao and respected expert on Arctic 
issues, the Northeast Passage “will change the structure of global trade. It may well bring about the 
emergence of a new, circumpolar super-economic belt made up of Asia, North America and Northern 
Europe.”26  Increased use of Northeast Passage would also alleviate dependence on the Malacca Strait, 
helping to address China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” ‡‡27 Moreover, piracy is a powerful disincentive for the 
use of conventional shipping routes; insurance costs for ships traveling via the Gulf of Aden toward the 
Suez Canal increased by 1000 percent between September 2008 and March 2009.28   
 
                                                     
‡‡
 The Malacca Dilemma refers to China’s high dependence upon the Malacca Strait for seaborne trade. 78 percent 
of its energy imports pass through this narrow thoroughfare. The perceived threats of bottlenecks or blockades of 
Chinese trade via the Malacca Strait have driven analysts and policymakers to consider alternate routes to secure 
China’s shipped exports and imports. 
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The benefits shipping companies might gain from a shortened Arctic passage could be offset, however, 
by logistical and technical challenges.  First, shippers would have to contend with unpredictable and 
often violent weather conditions. These include ice storms, extreme temperatures that can impair deck 
machinery, and destructive and undetectable blocks of ice.29  Such obstacles can block passages in the 
region and cause costly delays.   
 
Second, China has limited technical expertise in polar navigation.  This impairs China’s ability to have a 
robust shipping (or resource extraction) presence in the region.  Most vessels and related machinery 
used in Arctic waters are designed and constructed in Northern Europe, and China has little indigenous 
expertise in this field.  China’s sole icebreaker vessel, Xuelong (Snow Dragon), was purchased from 
Ukraine in 1993.  A second icebreaker was commissioned in 2009 after China’s State Council announced 
that in order to support China’s growing needs in the Arctic, Xuelong needed “brothers and sisters.”30 
The new vessel, China’s first domestically-constructed icebreaker, is slated for completion in 2014. §§31 
 
Third, China’s activities in the Arctic (trade or otherwise) are privy to the regulations of the Arctic 
Council and the territorial claimants therein.  Russia, which has jurisdiction over much of the Northeast 
Passage, has the power to impose regulations on international vessels traversing its waters.  Linda 
                                                     
§§
 By way of comparison, the United States has three icebreakers, two of which are designed for heavy ice. Of these 
two icebreakers, only one is currently in commission; the other is undergoing repairs until 2013. Some scholars and 
U.S. Navy personnel have called for the United States to invest more in heavy icebreakers in order to ensure that the 
United States has sufficient means to operate in increasingly navigable Arctic waters.  
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Jakobson, an expert on China’s Arctic policies, told the Financial Times in an interview that “China is 
particularly wary of Russia and whether or not it might demand high passage fees, which could erase 
some or most of the potential efficiency gains [for Chinese shippers in Russian Arctic waters].32  The 
chief executive of Russia’s state shipping company Sovkomflot, the world’s biggest supplier of ice-class 
vessels, has indicated that China’s wariness is well-founded.  He told the Financial Times that while 
Russia’s northern route would not be closed to foreign shipping companies, users would have to comply 
with Russian environmental and navigation regulations.  He added that unpredictable Arctic conditions 
and high insurance fees for container ships rendered a Chinese shipping presence there “nonsense.”33 
Sovkomflot has, however, been sending shipments of natural gas condensate to China via the Northeast 
Passage; 300,000 – 400,000 tons were planned to be shipped in 2011.34 
 
 
Territorial and Strategic Developments of Concern to China 
 
The issue of territorial control over the Arctic has figured prominently in Chinese and other discussions 
of the Arctic. Every Arctic state – except the United States – is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which gives a littoral state sovereign rights to the management 
of resources in its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its 
shores.*** UNCLOS requires that littoral states submit individual claims on the extent of their continental 
shelf to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which reviews and approves 
or disapproves submissions.35  All Arctic states except the United States have submitted claims to the 
CLCS (the United States cannot submit a claim since it is not party to UNCLOS). The most significant 
unsettled territorial claim in the Arctic is Russia’s claim to the underwater Lomonosov Ridge. If 
designated Russian territory by the CLCS, nearly half of the Arctic region would come under Russian 
jurisdiction.36  These claims have been watched closely in China, with some observers worrying that 
Russia’s claim, if recognized by the CLCS, could substantially restrict access of non-Russian entities to 
large areas of the Arctic.37  
 
Chinese discourse on Arctic territorial issues is diverse. At one end of the spectrum, commentators 
emphasize that China must not “stand idly by with hands in pockets,” and should preserve its “right to 
speak up” lest Arctic states choose to divvy up Arctic territory and resources amongst themselves, 
denying China (and the rest of the world) access.38 Some writers and analysts suggest that territorial 
claims in the region could cause tension or even conflict. Dr. Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of 
China, one of the more assertive voices, has opined that the territorial disputes in the Arctic constitute 
“Russia and some other states’ challenge to the international order and international law after the cold 
war.”39 One senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonel asserted sovereignty disputes in the Arctic 
might require the use of military force.40 Such commentators generally promote a more assertive stance 
by China in Arctic affairs. 
 
A somewhat divergent circle of thought tends to deemphasize territorial wrangling and advocate a much 
more cautious Chinese approach to the region.41 It would seem that proponents of such an approach 
fear that an assertive position regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic might 
undermine China’s position on its own rights and sovereignty in contested maritime spaces like the 
South China Sea. This line of thought has been reflected in commentary by Chinese officials, whose 
discussions of territorial developments in the region emphasize China’s respect for the sovereign 
                                                     
***
 The United States, while not a signatory to UNCLOS, generally recognizes and abides by the terms of the 
convention. 
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territorial rights of Arctic countries and reassure that China’s interests in the region are benign and 
cooperative in nature.42 Officially, China does not take a stance on any of the sovereignty disputes in the 
Arctic.43 
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